


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
15 January 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with the Secretary of State,
12 January 1979 (U)

1. The Secretary indicated that the [redacted] had
been resolved with the President in our favor. (S)

25X1
25X6



ILLEGIB

ILLEGIB
25X1
25X1

4. The Secretary mentioned he was very impressed by the report we
had just given him on the possibility of [redacted] He thought it
was the most credible one we had seen in two years. I told him [redacted]
[redacted] had been talking for some months about the possibility of
[redacted] though this was the first specific indicator in
which we put reasonable credence. I told the Secretary we'd be careful
to stay on top of this one. (S)

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DOS and DOE review(s) completed.

ORIGINAL CL BY 16 9947
☐ DECL ☒ REVW ON 15 JAN 85
EXT BY ND 6 YRS BY _____
REASON _____

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2

5. We had a long talk about Iran.

a. Our hopes seem to be on getting the religious and the military people to stick together, hopefully behind Bakhtiar but at least together.



c. I asked the Secretary if anyone was looking at what the longer term impacts on this were. He indicated yes, but he would like us to do so on the following assumptions--there is continued turmoil; there is a civil war; there is a takeover by a leftist-inclined government; there is a non-leftist government that generally stabilizes the internal situation, but certainly isn't as pro-American as the Shah has been (whether or not the Shah is part of this non-leftist government).

d. The Secretary is particularly interested in what effect this will have on the Saudis, on the peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel, and on Iraq. (S)

6. The Secretary asked when we had last put out something on Afghanistan. I told him we would get him the recent very short intelligence memorandum. I gave him the general briefing that I had given the President.

In response to that, he smiled and said he had asked Dobrynin a short time ago what they were doing in Afghanistan. He said Dobrynin had told him they had warned Taraki to go slow--that he could try to bite off too much if he wasn't careful. They had particularly warned him not to get involved in any foreign adventures, as that would be bad both for Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. (S)

7. We talked about Cambodia. The Secretary had asked the Chinese representatives in Washington about it. They indicated they thought Pol Pot could hold out for a long time in the mountains of south-central Cambodia; that Cambodia's mountains are ideal for guerrilla warfare; that there were still Kampuchean forces intact in the northwest; and that they wouldn't give any indication of how they thought they might be resupplied but that it didn't take many supplies to sustain guerrilla warfare.

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
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
8. We talked about the Teng visit. The Secretary would like a brief, up-to-date CIA view of the political relationships between Teng and Hua. I told him I didn't know how definitive we could be, but that we would produce something for him rapidly.

25X1



b. I told him what I had mentioned to the President and the President's response. I told him I would have a series of briefings on the Sino-Soviet military situation available at different degrees of sensitivity. The Secretary said he thought that would be a good idea.

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
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10. I asked him whether he had had an exchange with Dobrynin on getting the Soviets to restrain the Vietnamese in Cambodia. He said he had mentioned it, but that all Dobrynin said is that he'd have to go back to Moscow about that. (S)

25X1

11. We didn't talk about Pakistan. Leave it in, please. (C)



SECRET

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4



16. I didn't get to the item on [redacted] Keep it in. (C)

17. I didn't get to the item on the SS-20. (C)

18. I gave him [redacted] think piece on [redacted] He was delighted to get something that was unofficial but provocative. I also gave him the shorter of the two official pieces that were in the book on [redacted] (C)

19. We talked about the Dobrynin demarche on declassified photos. He asked if there was, in fact, an agreement that photos under 50 meters resolution would not be disclosed. I told him I wasn't sure of this yet, but that I thought it was an international agreement, not a U.S./Soviet agreement. (S)



STANSFIELD TURNER
Director



SECRET

16 JAN 1979

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)
Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	DD/RM				
4	DD/NFA		X		
5	DD/CT	2 (extracted)			
6	DD/A				
7	DD/O	2			
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EE0				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	NIO/NESA	5,6 (extracted)			
19	NIO/CH	8	12 (extracted)		
20	NIO/USSR-EE		9 (extracted)		
21		X			
22	ES		X		

SUSPENSE DATE:

Remarks: For action as indicated above.

To 4 & 7: Please make no additional copies of entire memo.

Executive Secretary
15 Jan 79
Date

3637 (4-78)

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TOL A

25X1A

[redacted] suggests you
touch on the conversation
on this subject which
you and [redacted] had
with the President. [redacted]
however, does not know
what was said }.

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SECRET

Tel-B

1000, 11 Jan 79

25X1A

DENG VISIT

You may want to ask Mr. Vance if there is any support you can give him in preparing for Deng's visit.

You may also want to add that your staff is doing two papers in preparation for this visit, but will not be able to distribute them to his staff for the time being.

-One on "PRC Leverage on North Korea" which as a matter of courtesy we will want to get NSC staff clearance prior to wider distribution. State should be getting a copy well before Deng's visit.

NIO/CH, [] notes that he detects a move afoot in State to make State the sole conduit to the White House for all communications on this visit. He thinks you should be alerted to the possibility that the matter will arise. (As you see I didn't do the spadework to discover that "proscribed from distribution" used in my earlier note overstated the matter.)

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25X10

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Tal E

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1115, 10 Jan 79

25X1A

PRISONER EXCHANGES

NIO/USSR notes that prisoner exchange negotiations seem in limbo. We've heard nothing for weeks. Presumably this is a matter that we would want to have resolved prior to a Summit which might occur as early as March. NIO/USSR suggests that you ask Secretary Vance how he sees this matter unfolding and what his plan is.

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Tal-F

25X

1000, 10 Jan 79

KAMPUCHEA

Vietnamese moved forward in main force units

Clear Kampucheans faded into jungle & still intact with light weapons

-Planning for protracted guerrilla war

Vietnamese probably didn't plan protracted war, either:

1. -Thought Kampucheans would fight set piece battles

-They didn't

2. -Thought populace would support Vietnam

Votes not yet in on latter possibility

-Question is, "Do people hate Vietnamese or Pol Pot the most?"

If populace support Pol Pot's resistance next necessary condition for more than few months war is outside support

Chinese actions - apart from trying to resupply

Teach Vietnam a lesson, not much influenced by specific military situations in Kampuchea

Still moving heavy forces (not much infantry) toward border

-Central & Eastern Chinese military forces all on alert

Constrained now by Deng's planned visit

-This may have influenced Vietnamese to step up timetable

At any rate high probability of PRC punitive expedition

-Vietnamese troops far back

-Number of cities & paramilitary forces near border to "punish"

• Soviet actions

No signs of a buildup along border

-But if PRC bloddies SVN nose, the Soviets will want to bloody a PRC nose.

Again PRC main force units far back from border

But no PRC owned targets near Sino-Soviet border of value comparable to Vietnamese owned targets near Sino-Vietnam border

So situation remains uncertain & dangerous as we discussed in late November.

(Sino-Soviet Border Map)



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1110, 10 Jan 79

USSR-VIETNAM

NIO/USSR notes that there are press reports to the effect that Vance met Dobrynin and asked the Russians to do something to restrain the Vietnamese in Cambodia. Dobrynin said they couldn't control the Vietnamese. NIO/USSR has seen no official reports of this meeting and suggests that you ask Mr. Vance to expand on that conversation.

-Did it in fact occur?

-What was the tenor of Dobrynin's reply?

-Did Dobrynin expand on why they couldn't control or influence the Vietnamese?

Moscow

S E C R E T

Tab I

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25X1

0800, 10 Jan 79

AFGHANISTAN TALKING POINTS
(DESIGNED TO FOLLOW PAKISTAN TALKING POINTS)

(Map)

Across the border in Afghanistan Taraki is still in a troubled position

- A. Taraki growing more dependent on Soviets. With Soviet aid he's done two things.
- B. He's ruthlessly weeded out civilian and military opposition
 - 1. Replaced technical needs in both with Soviets
 - 1,500 civilians (+ 500)
 - 700 military advisers (+ 200)
 - 2. 10,000 in jail & many executions
- C. With Soviet advisers he's applied military pressure to tribal unrest.

(Rebellion Map)

- 1. But tribal rebellions growing more serious
 - Largely same sort of historic resistance to any government we discussed in Pakistan
 - Seems to have some religious flavor too
 - No evidence that Pakistan is aiding tribes; Pakistani supplies could make rebellions much more serious
 - Taraki controls urban centers but is weak in Iran-Pakistan border areas
- 2. Heavy casualties on both sides
 - a. Four basic scenarios that are credible.
 - (1) Rebellion wanes & return to "norm" i.e. clans run things in the mountains and gov't runs the lowlands
 - (a) Could result from exhaustion
 - The really warlike clans have already taken up the sword
 - There's always been a cycle in this sort of thing
 - (b) Working against this is
 - Religious element of conflict
 - Taraki's lack of personal ties with chieftains that Daoud & before him the king used to keep the clans in check

Taraki could have opted not to try - didn't

~~Taraki hasn't opted - lose face~~

(c) If this plays out Taraki could become very powerful

- He's basically running a Stalinist game in the urban centers, in effect building a network of commissars and informers on every block
- Temporarily the wholesale replacement of competent people by political loyalists has weakened government effectiveness, but
- In the long haul these programs will give Taraki a firm grip.

~~(2) Rebellion expands~~

~~(2)~~ Rebellion simmers and waxes - goes on

-This is the most likely near-term prospect

~~(3)~~ Rebellion explodes

(1) Perhaps because obtained outside support

- Dissidents based in Peshawar, Pakistan have sought Saudi, Pakistani, Iranian and US aid, so far without success
- Lacking this the clans have only their indigenous gun shops & smuggled supplies

(2) Perhaps because of some charismatic leader

- Abdul Wali, cousin of former king and Daoud, has agreed to join the rebels & might be popular enough.
- There are other candidates, e.g. Mostagni (ambassador to Poland)

(3) If rebellions continue to grow Army's loyalty to Taraki might crack

~~(4)~~ Skullduggery in the capital - Assassination of Taraki

- a. Muslim Brotherhood is still plotting, but was badly hurt by arrests
- b. Probably Amin, his deputy, would replace him who is even more pro-Soviet and doctrinaire than Taraki
- c. Amin would probably carry on so the assassin would have to get both of them to change things much

D. Soviet options

S E C R E T

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1. If Taraki overthrown suddenly by either tribal rebellion exploding or assassination, Soviets probably would live with whoever succeeds him.
2. If challenge grows slowly Soviets might well get more and more involved in propping Taraki up.

- 5 Dec Treaty seemed say they willing do this

- Conspicuously lacking provision consultation on outside threats

- Setting up Cubans -

- Ambassador

- Advisors next?

- Incentives different than Africa

E. Sovs seemed want moderate profile

- Treaty increased

- Brought Taraki to more public ID w/communism

- But cautious international front

S E C R E T

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


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Afghanistan: Main Areas of Dissidence



PROSPECTS

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Behind this sheet is "think-piece." If you think it would be stimulating to Mr. Vance you may want to deliver it as one man's opinion, not an Intelligence Community judgment.

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DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE ON DECLASS PHOTOS

NOTE FOR THE DCI's MEETING WITH SECRETARY VANCE - 11 January 1979

25X1



We understand that the Department is anxious to transmit this legislation to the White House, but we believe it is important to clarify the problem before the bill goes to the Congress. We are working on a remedy this afternoon and plan to forward suggestions to the Department and to the Office of Management and Budget no later than tomorrow morning. Recommend you tell Secretary Vance that we have these problems and will provide alternatives by tomorrow morning, and request that he hold up his proposal until we can get them to him.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

78-7582

ILLEGIB

December 30, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Relations with the People on Taiwan

As President of the United States, I have constitutional responsibility for the conduct of the foreign relations of the nation. The United States has announced that on January 1, 1979, it is recognizing the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and is terminating diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. The United States has also stated that, in the future, the American people will maintain commercial, cultural and other relations with the people of Taiwan without official government representation and without diplomatic relations. I am issuing this memorandum to facilitate maintaining those relations pending the enactment of legislation on the subject.

I therefore declare and direct that:

(A) Departments and agencies currently having authority to conduct or carry out programs, transactions, or other relations with or relating to Taiwan are directed to conduct and carry out those programs, transactions, and relations beginning January 1, 1979, in accordance with such authority and, as appropriate, through the instrumentality referred to in paragraph D below.

(B) Existing international agreements and arrangements in force between the United States and Taiwan shall continue in force and shall be performed and enforced by departments and agencies beginning January 1, 1979, in accordance with their terms and, as appropriate, through that instrumentality.

(C) In order to effectuate all of the provisions of this memorandum, whenever any law, regulation, or order of the United States refers to a foreign country, nation, state, government, or similar entity, departments and agencies shall

construe those terms and apply those laws, regulations, or orders to include Taiwan.

(D) In conducting and carrying out programs, transactions, and other relations with the people on Taiwan, interests of the people of the United States will be represented as appropriate by an unofficial instrumentality in corporate form, to be identified shortly.

(E) The above directives shall apply to and be carried out by all departments and agencies, except as I may otherwise determine.

I shall submit to the Congress a request for legislation relative to non-governmental relationships between the American people and the people on Taiwan.

This memorandum shall be published in the Federal Register.

Jimmy Carter

STAT

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DDO STAFF MEETING MINUTES #76

10 January 1979

1. Night Calls to Reports Officers

The Acting DDO noted that as a result of a recent reorganization, analysts from the Office of Current Operations are now working in close association with the Operations Center throughout the night. It is anticipated that the analysts will wish to incorporate late-coming intelligence reports into their publications and may call Division reports officers late at night to obtain approval to use [] items. The Acting DDO asked the Divisions to be alert to this situation and to monitor it in order to determine if Division reports officers receive an excessive amount of nighttime calls so that special arrangements can be taken if necessary.

25X1

2. Presidential Memorandum on Waste and Inefficiency

The Acting DDO noted that the Chief EPDS has been assigned responsibility for preparing the Directorate's response to the DDCI concerning the recent memorandum from the President on the subject of curtailing or eliminating waste and inefficiency. Mr. Stein stated that he would look into the possibility of the Inspector General providing an Agency-wide response rather than having each Directorate do so individually.


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4. Reserve Releases

The Acting DDO stated that either he or the DDO will attend the forthcoming hearings of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to consider three requested reserve releases. 

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5. DDCI's Trip

The Acting Chief EA Division reported that the current trip of the DDCI and Chief EA to East Asia is going well. The DDCI and Chief EA are scheduled to return to Headquarters on 14 January.

6. Unit Citation

The Chief Personnel Management reported that IMS has been recommended for a Unit Citation for its excellent performance in providing materials in a timely fashion requested by the House Subcommittee on Assassinations.

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